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INTRODUCTORY ESSAY:




The term "war on terror" has undoubtedly entered our common usage,
notwithstanding heavy criticism that instead of using it as a metaphor, as in the
"war on poverty" or the "war on drugs," terminology which has primarily served a
rhetorical purpose, the US views the struggle against al Qaeda and associated
terrorist groups and individuals as a real war.' Other critics have argued that
employing the law of armed conflict is not an effective tool to counter terrorism,
urging instead to consider terrorism as primarily a law enforcement problem.
Thus, they suggest using the traditional criminal justice system to arrest, prosecute,
and punish terrorists if they are found guilty.2 President George W. Bush directly
and unequivocally responded to such critics in his 2004 State of the Union Address
to the Congress:
I know that some people question if America is really in a war at
all. They view terrorism more as a crime, a problem to be solved
mainly with law enforcement and indictments. After the World Trade
Center was first attacked in 1993, some of the guilty were indicted and
tried and convicted, and sent to prison. But the matter was not settled.
The terrorists were still training and plotting in other nations, and
drawing up more ambitious plans. After the chaos and carnage of
September the 1lth, it is not enough to serve our enemies with legal
papers. The terrorists and their supporters declared war on the United
States, and war is what they got.
3
John Evans Professor, University of Denver; Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law and
Director, International Legal Studies Program, University of Denver Sturm College of Law
1. Lord Goldsmith, the UK Attorney General from 2001 to 2007, considers the term "not only
misleading but positively dangerous." Lord Goldsmith, Justice and the Rule of Law, 43 INT'L LAWYER
27, 29 (2009) [hereafter Goldsmith]. In his words, "saying 'War on Terror' then justifies holding
people without trial after the international armed conflict has come to an end until this amorphous 'War
on Terror' has come to an end -- and who is going to say when it has? And secondly, it has a powerful
impact on legal questions, like whose job it is to deal with. My perception reading U.S. Supreme Court
decisions is that calling it 'War on Terror' is designed to give to the Executive powers without the
control of Congress because as military action it falls to the President as Commander-in-Chief to make
decisions." Id.
2. See, e.g., Leila Nadya Sadat, Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 3 WASH. UNIV. GLOBAL
STUDIES L. REV. 135 (2004).
3. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004) available at
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Although Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reportedly said in March 2009
that the new Administration had dropped "war on terror" from its lexicon, as she
told reporters, "the [Obama] administration has stopped using the phrase and I
think that speaks for itself. , President Barack Obama stated in his national
security remarks on May 21, 2009, "Now let me be clear. We are indeed at war
with al Qaeda and its affiliates."5
It seems appropriate to acknowledge that if and when terrorist acts are
committed in situations of armed conflict, the laws of war apply to such acts,
which may constitute war crimes; and when they are committed outside of
situations of armed conflict, individuals suspected of committing such acts are not
subject to the laws of war.6 And along with the application of the laws of war,
when they are applicable, human rights norms, some of which are non-derogable,
must govern trial and detention of suspected terrorists. Also, suspected terrorists
must be entitled to independent judicial review and the application of customary
international law principles enshrined in Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions 7 and the pertinent provisions of Additional Protocols 18 and 119 of
1977.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom (last visited Aug. 8, 2009).
4. Sue Pleming, Obama team drops "war on terror rhetoric, REUTERS, March 31, 2009
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSTRE52T7MH20090330.
5. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security (May 21, 2009)
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-Office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-
Security-5-21-09/ [hereafter President's National Security Remarks].
6. See International Commission of Jurists, Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism,
Counter-terrorism, and Human Rights, Assessing Damage, Urging Action: Executive Summary, at 9
(Feb. 16, 2009) available at http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/ExecSumm.pdf [hereafter Eminent Jurists Panel].
The Panel stated:
The laws of war only apply when there is a situation of armed conflict according
to objective criteria recognised under international law. Thus, when terrorist acts
are committed outside of such situations, they are not governed by international
humanitarian law, but by domestic criminal law and international human rights
law and, perhaps, international criminal law. Accordingly, individuals who are
suspected of terrorist offences committed outside of situations of armed conflict
cannot legally be labelled, tried, and/or targeted as combatants. Where terrorist
acts trigger or occur during an armed conflict, such acts may well constitute war
crimes, and they are governed by international humanitarian law, together with
international human rights law. Persons suspected of having perpetrated such
offences during an armed conflict cannot legally be placed beyond the protection
of the law. As a minimum, they must be treated in accordance with non-
derogable human rights guarantees as well as with the customary law standards
embodied in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Article
75 of Additional Protocol I, or Articles 4 and 6 of Additional Protocol II, of
1977.
Id.
7. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.. Common Article 3 appears in all four Geneva Conventions. It
prohibits "violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture," (Article 3(l)(a)) and "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment" (Article 3(l)(c).
8. Protocol Additional (No. I) to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the
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The Bush administration's counter-terrorism policies in waging war on terror
raised questions about the administration's real--contrasted with its professed-
commitment to faithfully adhere to the rule of law. The administration's
questionable practices included the following: designating "suspected" terrorists
accused of belonging to or associated with the Taliban or al Qaeda terrorist
network as "illegal/unlawful enemy combatants"; the initial decision by the
administration not to apply the Geneva Conventions to these detainees subjected to
indefinite detention without trial and with inadequate review and the establishment
of military commissions to try some of them; secret detention of "high value
detainees;" harsh interrogation techniques to which several were subjected
resulting in systematic infliction of pain and suffering, rising to the level of torture;
warrantless electronic wiretapping and searches and invasive surveillance; and the
use of extraordinary renditions of prisoners to countries where they were tortured.
As the Bush administration characterized its efforts in combating terrorism as
fighting a global war on terror, its claim to use force for targeted killings even
beyond the zone of active armed conflict, such as in Yemen, and the US invasion
of Iraq, justified, in part, on Saddam Hussein's alleged contacts with al Qaeda and
terrorism, also came under scrutiny.
While campaigning for president, then-Senator Barack Obama promised to
close the military detention facility at Guantdnamo Naval Base if elected, and was
critical of several of the Bush administration's counter terrorism practices
mentioned above. True to his promise, on his third day in office, President Barack
Obama signed several executive orders charting a new direction by reversing most
of these questionable policies and practices, some of which will be the subject of
review in this essay.
I. SELECTED COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION AFTER 9/11 AND THE NEW DIRECTION TAKEN BY THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION
The following selected policies and practices will be reviewed here:
detention; interrogation techniques; military commissions; extraordinary rendition;
and targeted killing.
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, concluded at Geneva, 8 June 1977, entered into
force 7 December 1978, 1977 U.N.J.Y.B. 95, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977), Article 75 prohibits
violations mentioned earlier under Common Article 3, including the right to be tried in one's presence
(Article 75, sec. 4(e)).
9. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
609, 1977 U.N.J.Y.B. 135, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977). Article 4 prohibits violations as mentioned earlier
under Common Article 3. Article 6 applies to the prosecution and punishment of criminal offenses
related to armed conflict, including the right to be tried in one's presence (Article 6(e)).
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A. The Guant6namo Detention Camp and the Issue of Detention
1. Trends
On January 22, 2009, President Barack Obama issued an Executive Order
directing that Guantdnamo detention facility be closed within one year.10 This was
based on the findings that over the past seven years the Department of Defense had
detained at Guantdnamo approximately 800 suspected terrorists as "enemy
combatants," raising "significant concerns nationally and internationally,"1 and
that "prompt and appropriate disposition of the individuals currently detained at
Guantdtnamo and closure of the facilities in which they are detained would further
the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and the
interests of justice. ,12  The Executive Order also stated that the Guantdnamo
detainees have the constitutional privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
13
The President ordered 1) immediate review of the status of each Guantfnamo
detainee1 4 and 2) the detainees' confinement to be in accordance with humane
standards, including the application of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions. 15  During the review period, all proceedings before military
commissions were halted.1 6 The approximately 240 who remained in detention
(more than 525 detainees were released before President Obama took office) "shall
be returned to their home country, released, transferred to a third country, or
transferred to another United States detention facility in a matter consistent with
law and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.,
17
Subsequently, in his May 21, 2009, address, President Obama discussed in
detail the detainees' cases at Guantdnamo, which he said fell into five distinct
categories: 1) to try those who have violated American criminal laws in US federal
courts whenever feasible; 2) detainees who have violated the laws of war to be
tried through revised and reformed military commissions which are "fair,
legitimate, and effective;" 3) detainees who have been ordered released by the
courts; 4) detainees who can be transferred safely to another country; and 5)
detainees who cannot be prosecuted for past crimes because, for example, evidence
may be tainted, but who pose a clear danger to the security of the United States
will not be released.18  As of July 21, 2009, eleven prisoners had been
transferred-four to Bermuda, three to Saudi Arabia, and one each to Chad, Iraq,
France, and the United Kingdom.
19
10. Exec. Order No. 13,492, Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantdnamo
Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 27, 2009).
11. Id. § 2(a).
12. Id. § 2(b).
13. Id. § l(c).
14. Id. § 4(a).
15. Id. § 6.
16. Id. §7.
17. Id.§3.
18. President's National Security Remarks, supra note 5.
19. Amnesty International, USA, Sounding a Note of Urgency, Judge Loses Patience Over
Guantanamo Case; Detention and Interagency Policy Task Forces Delay Reports, Al Index: AMR
VOL. 37:4
INTRODUCTORY ESSAY
Elaborating on the fifth category, the President stated:
Al Qaeda terrorists and their affiliates are at war with the United States,
and those that we capture-like other prisoners of war-must be
prevented from attacking us again. Having said that, we must recognize
that these detention policies cannot be unbounded. They can't be based
simply on what I or the executive branch decide alone. That's why my
administration has begun to reshape the standards that apply to ensure
that they are in line with the rule of law. We must have clear,
defensible, and lawful standards for those who fall into this category.
We must have fair procedures so that we don't make mistakes. We
must have a thorough process of periodic review, so that any prolonged
detention is carefully evaluated and justified.2 °
He said that the objective is to construct a legitimate legal framework for the
remaining Guantdnamo detainees whom the administration cannot transfer and will
not release.
Earlier, on March 13, 2009, the Justice Department filed a memorandum in
the District of Columbia District Court regarding the administration's detention
authority pertaining to Guantdnamo detainees. 2' While it abandoned the Bush
administration's term "enemy combatant," the Obama administration argued in the
memorandum for the continued detention of Guantdnamo detainees. This, it said,
was pursuant to a valid exercise of the administration's authority to use force
against "members of an opposing armed force ... [including] the irregular forces
of an armed group like al-Qaeda" or "members of enemy forces," even if "they
have not actually committed or attempted to commit any act of depredation or
,22entered the theater or zone of active military operations."
The Obama administration relied on the principles of the laws of war and on
the statutory authority given by Congress in its Authorization for the Use of
Military Force (AUMF) 23 to contend that "the President has authority to detain
persons who he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks" of September 11, 2001, and persons who harbored those responsible for
these attacks, and also
to detain in this armed conflict those persons who were part of, or
substantially supported Taliban or al-Qaeda forces or associated forces
that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition
51/084/2009, July 21, 2009 available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=
ENGUSA20090721001.
20. Id.
21. Respondents' Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority Relative to
Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, In re Guantanamo
Bay Detainee Litigation, Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH) (D.C. 2009) [hereafter Obama Administration's
Memorandum].
22. Id., at 5-6.
23. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub.L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
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partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act, or
has directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces.
24
The Memorandum stated that the position the administration was asserting
was not "meant to define the contours of authority for military operations
generally, or detention in other contexts," but was limited to the Guantdnamo
detainees, as "[a] forward-looking multi-agency effort is under way to develop a
comprehensive detention policy with respect to individuals captured in connection
with armed conflicts and counterterrorism operations, and the views of the
Executive Branch may evolve as a result. 25  This was a reference to another
executive order signed by President Obama on January 22, 2009, for conducting a
review of detention policy options.26 Under this executive order, a Special Task
Force on Detainee Disposition was established
to conduct a comprehensive review of the lawful options available to
the Federal Government with respect to the apprehension, detention,
trial, transfer, release, or other disposition of individuals captured or
apprehended in connection with armed conflicts and counterterrorism
operations, and to identify such options as are consistent with the
national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and
the interests ofjustice.
27
The Task Force was to submit a report within six months but the Order provided
for an extension if necessary and the Task Force did seek an extension.
Finally, the November 20, 2008, Report of the US Senate Committee on
Armed Services on the Detainees' Treatment in U.S. Custody28 is revealing. It
indeed is a harsh indictment of those responsible for the abuse, as it states in its
Executive Summary:
The abuse of detainees in U.S. custody cannot simply be attributed
to the actions of"a few bad apples" acting on their own. The fact is that
senior officials in the United States government solicited information on
how to use aggressive techniques, redefined the law to create the
appearance of their legality, and authorized their use against detainees.
Those efforts damaged our ability to collect accurate intelligence that
could save lives, strengthened the hand of our enemies, and
compromised our moral authority. This report is a product of the
Committee's inquiry into how those unfortunate results came about.
29
24. Obama Administration's Memorandum, supra note 21, at 1-2, quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1, 38 (1942).
25. Id. at 2.
26. Exec, Order No. 13,493, Review of Detention Policy Options, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,901 (Jan. 27,
2009).
27. Id. § 1(e).
28. Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody,
110th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Nov. 20, 2008) available at http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/supporting/2008/
Detainees. 121108.pdf.
29. Id. at xii.
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The comprehensive report, comprising more than 230 pages, detailed the various
memoranda, opinions, recommendations, orders, and discussions and debates of
specific aggressive interrogation plans and techniques discussed above.
2. Appraisal and Recommendation
While abandoning the "enemy combatant" label, the Memorandum's new
definition authorizes detention, adding a requirement that a detainee would have to
have "substantially supported," and not merely "supported" al-Qaeda, the Taliban,
or forces associated with them in order to justify the detention. This definition
would obviously not have satisfied those who were critical of the Bush
administration's Guantdnamo detention policies-indefinite detention without
trial-because it seemed merely a continuation of the prior policies initiated by
President Bush. Joanne Mariner, terrorism and counterterrorism director at Human
Rights Watch, said, "By bringing the practice of indefinite detention without
charge onto US soil, the Obama administration would be closing Guantdnamo in
name only. President Obama should think hard about whether he wants to
institutionalize the discredited practice that made Guantdnamo a stain on the
reputation of the United States., 30  She added, "Pursuing a policy of indefinite
detention without charge would send the Obama administration down the same
misguided path as its predecessor. It would be a major break from longstanding
principles of American justice.
31
According to Steven A. Engel, who was a senior lawyer in the Bush
administration's Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel and responsible for
detainee issues, the term "enemy combatant" was not the issue. He observed that
the Memorandum's definition "seems fundamentally consistent with the positions
of the prior administration.",32  He added, "The important point is that they
recognize that we can detain members of the enemy" during a war.
33
The major issue of contention is the US assertion that it is engaged in a global
war against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their affiliated forces. Consequently, the
US claims the authority to capture a person from anywhere in the world and not
merely from the theater of an armed conflict, and detain that person indefinitely.
This authority it claims on the grounds of the person's support for or association
with al-Qaeda or the Taliban. As the Memorandum argued,
the AUMF is not limited to persons captured on the battlefields of
Afghanistan. Such a limitation "would contradict Congress' clear
intention, and unduly hinder both the President's ability to protect our
country from future acts of terrorism and his ability to gather vital
30. Human Rights Watch, US: Drop Plans for Indefinite Detention Without Charge, June 29,
2009, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/06/29/us-drop-plans-indefinite-detention-without-
charge.
31. Id.
32. C. William Glaberson, U.S. Won't Label Terror Suspects as "Combatants, " N.Y. TIMES,
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intelligence regarding the capability, operations, and intentions of this
elusive and cunning adversary." Under a functional analysis,
individuals who provide substantial support to al-Qaeda forces in other
parts of the world may properly be deemed part of al-Qaeda itself. Such
activities may also constitute the type of substantial support that "in
analogous circumstances in a traditional international armed conflict, is
sufficient to justify detention.
34
Relying on Articles 3 and 4 of the Third Geneva Convention and Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions and their Commentaries, the Memorandum rejected the Petitioner's
contention that the US can detain only those "directly participating in hostilities,"
and that all detainees must be treated as civilians.35  Human Rights Watch's
Mariner urged the administration to reconsider its views and prosecute "terror
suspects in the federal courts, not [look] for ways to circumvent the criminal
justice system.36
Although the United States claims the power to capture a suspected terrorist
anywhere in the world, in reality those captured are primarily in Afghanistan,
which is the theater of the armed conflict, or the neighboring Pakistan, which
arguably is also part of the armed conflict theater. Thus, above all, the main issue
is the form, structure, and content of the preventive detention regime and the
nature of the legal protections afforded the detainees. As President Obama has
stated, the US detention policies must embody "clear, defensible, and lawful
standards" in line with the rule of law, with fair procedures and a thorough process
of periodic review to carefully evaluate and justify any prolonged detention.3 7 This
suggests that there will be adequate safeguards so that detainees' treatment is not
subject to an arbitrary decision process.
The President's call for the US detention policies to comply with the rule of
law implicitly suggests that the detainees will be treated fairly. Does this mean
that they will have the right to an independent hearing? Will an impartial body
providing adequate due process hear an appeal from the detainees? Will they be
informed of the reasons for which they are being held? Finally, will there be
judicial review of their detention? The President's Task Force has yet to provide
answers to these questions, and I hope that the Task Force report recommends that
detainees be entitled to these rights.
38
34. Obama Administration's Memorandum, supra note 21, at 7.
35. Id. at 8-10.
36. Human Rights Watch, US: Obama Should Reconsider New Position on Guantanamo
Detainees, March 13, 2009, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/03/13/us-obama-should-
reconsider-new-position-guantanamo-detainees
37. See supra text accompanying note 20.
38. For similar suggestions see Anthony Dworkin, Beyond the "War on Terror: Towards a New
Transatlantic Framework for Counterterrorism, EUR. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. 6-7 (May 27, 2009),
available at http://ecfr.3cdn.net/1el8727eafdddcceb7_81 m6ibwez.pdf.
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B. Coercive Interrogation Techniques
1. Trends
The torture memos written by the Department of Justice in the Bush
administration have been the subject of much discussion in the recent past. In his
National Security Remarks, President Obama discussed his release of these
memos. In his words,
I did not do this because I disagreed with the enhanced interrogation
techniques that those memos authorized, and I didn't release the
documents because I rejected their legal rationales-although I do on
both counts. I released the memos because the existence of that
approach to interrogation was already widely known, the Bush
administration had acknowledged its existence, and I had already
banned those methods.
39
The Bush administration's authorization of coercive techniques was based on
the Department of Justice's memos and legal opinions. To illustrate, Jay S. Bybee,
then-Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel to Alberto
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, stated in his memo regarding Standards of
Conduct for Interrogation:
We conclude that for an act to constitute torture as defined in Section
2340, it must inflict pain that is difficult to endure. Physical pain
amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure,
impairment of bodily function, or even death. For purely mental pain or
suffering to amount to torture under Section 2340, it must result in
significant psychological harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting for
months or even years. We conclude that the mental harm also must
result from one of the predicate acts listed in the statute, namely: threats
of imminent death; threats of infliction of the kind of pain that would
amount to physical torture; infliction of such physical pain as a means
of psychological torture, use of drugs or other procedures designed to
deeply disrupt the senses, or fundamentally alter an individual's
personality; or threatening to do any of these things to a third party.
The legislative history simply reveals that congress intended for the
statute's definition to track the Convention's definition of torture and
the reservations, understandings, and declarations that the United States
submitted with its ratification. We conclude that the statute, taken as a
whole, makes plain that it prohibits only extreme acts.
4
0
39. President's National Security Remarks, supra note 5.
40. Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to
the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogations under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1,
2002) available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/
dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf.
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In another memo, regarding Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and
Taliban Detainees, Bybee concluded that the Geneva Conventions "do not protect
members of the al Qaeda organization, which as a non-State actor cannot be a
party to the international agreements governing war.,
41
It was on the basis of this second memo and on the legal opinion rendered by
the Attorney General in his letter of February 1, 2002, to President Bush, that the
President announced his decision that "none of the provisions of Geneva apply to
our conflict with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the world
because, among other reasons, al-Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party to
Geneva. 42 He further determined that although he had "the authority under the
Constitution to suspend Geneva as between the United States and Afghanistan," he
declined "to exercise that authority [at the time]" and thus determined "that the
provisions of Geneva will apply to [the] present conflict with the Taliban[,
reserving] the right to exercise this authority in this or future conflicts. 4 3 He also
determined that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions did not apply to
either al Qaeda or Taliban detainees, 44 and that, as unlawful combatants the
Taliban detainees do not qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of the Geneva
Conventions, nor do al Qaeda detainees, because the Conventions do not apply to
the US conflict with al Qaeda.45
The International Committee of the Red Cross issued a report on the treatment
of the "high-value" detainees held by the CIA, concluding that in many cases the
detainees had been tortured, a report that was leaked to the press in March 2009.46
The response of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the British Parliament was
telling, as in its 2007 Annual Report it contended that "given the clear differences
in definition, the UK can no longer rely on US assurances that it does not use
torture, and we recommend that the government ... not rely on such assurances in
the future. 47
President Obama rejected the Bush administration's interpretations of
international law redefining torture and thus allowing the infliction of pain and
suffering through coercive interrogation methods, such as "water-boarding," a
simulated drowning technique which results in near suffocation of suspected
41. Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to
the President, and William J. Haynes I1, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Re:
Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 22, 2002) available at
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/012202bybee.pdf.
42. President George W. Bush, Memorandum for: the Vice President; the Secretary of State; the
Secretary of Defense; the Attorney General, et al., para. 2(a), at 1 (Feb. 7, 2002) available at
http://www.pegc.us/archive/WhiteHouse/bushmemo_20020207ed.pdf.
43. Id. para. 2(b).
44. Id. para. 2(c).
45. Id. para. 2(c) and (d).
46. International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen "High-
Value '" Detainees" in CIA Custody 26, February 2007 available at www.nybooks.com/icrc-report.pdf.
47. UK FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL REPORT 2007 25




terrorists. The reversal came in an executive order he signed on January 22, 2009,
entitled Ensuring Lawful Interrogations.48 The executive order revoked the earlier
Executive Order of 13440 of July 20, 2007, which had interpreted Geneva
Conventions Common Article 3 as applied to a program of detention and
interrogation operated by the Central Intelligence Agency. It also revoked all other
"executive directives, orders, and regulations inconsistent with this order issued
from September 11, 2001 to January 20, 2009, "concerning detention or the
interrogation of detained individuals.49
Henceforth, detainees are to be treated consistent with the pertinent laws and
treaties, including the Convention Against Torture and Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions.5 ° The CIA's interrogation techniques or treatments related
to interrogation must comply with nineteen interrogation methods outlined in the
Army Field Manual interrogation techniques and treatments. 51 Interpretations of
Common Article 3 must also be in conformity with the Army Field Manual and not
on any interpretations of federal criminal laws, the Convention Against Torture
and Common Article 3 issued by the Department of Justice between September 11,
2001, and January 20, 2009.52
Furthermore, the CIA's secret prisons are abolished and the CIA is prohibited
from operating any such detention facility in the future.53 The International
Committee of the Red Cross is to have access to detained individuals.54 Finally, a
Special Interagency Task Force is established to review interrogation practices
allowed by the Army Field Manual, "and, if warranted, to recommend any
additional or different guidance for other departments or agencies," and transfer
policies of individuals to other nations.55 The Task Force was to report to the
President within six months or seek extension if necessary. It should be noted that
the report was delayed as the Task Force sought such extension. However, on
August 24, 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that the Task Force on
Interrogations and Transfer Policies had proposed the establishment of a
"specialized interrogation group" of law enforcement, intelligence, and defense
officials "to conduct interrogations in a manner that will strengthen national
security consistent with the rule of law."
5 6
48. Exec. Order No. 13,491, Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (January 27,
2009).
49. Id.§l.
50. Id. § 3(a).
51. Id. § 3(b).
52. Id. § 3(c).
53. Id. § 4(a). On August 24, 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder appointed a federal prosecutor
to investigate CIA interrogation practices "after the Justice Department released a long-secret report
showing interrogators choked a prisoner repeatedly and threatened to kill another detainee's children."
Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Investigation Is Ordered Into C.I.A. Abuse Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
25, 2009, at Al.
54. Id. § 4(b).
55. Id. § 5.
56. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Special Task Force on Interrogations and Transfer
Policies Issues Its Recommendations to the President (Aug. 24, 2009) available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/August/09-ag-835.html.
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2. Appraisal and Recommendation
The Obama administration's unequivocal rejection of the coercive
interrogation techniques used against detainees under the Bush administration has
given a powerful message to the world community that the United States is setting
a new course, that it is renewing its commitment to strictly comply with
international human rights standards, and that its interrogation policies are now in
synch with the accepted international law norms on torture.
Along with issuing the executive order prohibiting torture, President Obama
has strongly expressed his opposition to torture, including the "core principle that
torture is never justified." On the 25th anniversary of the Torture Convention,
June 26, 2009, the President stated:
Torture violates United States and international law as well as human
dignity. Torture is contrary to the founding documents of our country,
and the fundamental values of our people. It diminishes the security of
those who carry it out, and surrenders the moral authority that must
form the basis for just leadership. That is why the United States must
never engage in torture, and must stand against torture wherever it takes
place.57
However, as the United States would rely upon the Eighth Amendment to the
Constitution's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments," its
interpretation may vary from an interpretation under the Convention Against
Torture mandate prohibiting "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment." These
varying interpretations notwithstanding, the outcomes resulting from the
application of these standards may not be that different. Consequently, this is not
likely to create any major problem. But there still remains an outstanding issue
regarding the questioning of detainees held overseas by other countries and the use
of information received from such questioning. There is a need to formulate
common standards on this critical point, on which the US and its allies can agree.5t
C. Trial by Military Commissions
1. Trends
President Obama's reversal of the Bush administration's counterterrorism
policies did not include the rejection of military commissions, which he supported
as having "a history in the United States dating back to George Washington and
the Revolutionary War.59  He said they provide an appropriate venue to try
detainees accused of violating the laws of war, because they "allow for the
protection of sensitive sources and methods of intelligence-gathering; they allow
for the safety and security of participants; and for the presentation of evidence
57. Press Release, The White House, Statement by President Barack Obama on United Nations
International Day in Support of Torture Victims (June 26, 2009) http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/Statement-by-President-Barack-Obama-on-United-Nations-Intemational-Day-in-
Support-of-Torture-Victims/.
58. For a similar recommendation, see Dworkin, supra note 38, at 7.
59. President's National Security Remarks, supra note 5.
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gathered from the battlefield that cannot always be effectively presented in federal
courts."
6 0
In 2006 the US Supreme Court held in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,61 that the
military commission procedure violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice, as
well as the Geneva Conventions.62 The Court observed that the military
commission's procedures must include the protections of Common Article 3,
including the right of the accused to be present at trial and to have access to
evidence of guilt.
63
In response to Hamdan, where the Court had also ruled that the military
commission to try the suspected terrorist was not properly authorized by any
Congressional act, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2 00 6,64
under which detained aliens determined to be enemy combatants were denied
jurisdiction with respect to habeas actions. 65 In a challenge on this issue before the
Supreme Court, Boumediene v. Bush,66 the Court ruled five-to-four that "the
privilege of habeas corpus entitled the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to
demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to 'the erroneous application or
interpretation' of relevant law.",67 It held that the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA)
68
procedures under which the accused was being tried, and pursuant to which the
court reviews the legality of standards and procedures of Combatant Status Review
Tribunal determinations, was "an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus." 69 In
dissent, Chief Justice Roberts stressed that habeas may be suspended only under
the Suspension Clause and thus only when public safety requires it in times of
rebellion or invasion.70
It is also worth noting that the US Human Rights Council's Special
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Sheinin, criticized the use of military
commissions to try terrorist suspects.7' In his report following his mission to the
United States of America in May 2007, Sheinin noted "issues surrounding the
independence of the commissions, their potential use to try civilians, and their lack
60. Id.
61. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). It was a five-to-three decision, with Chief Justice
Roberts recusing himself as he had voted in favor of the government when the case was heard by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia as Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
62. Id. at 615-625.
63. Id. at 635.
64. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub.L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (Oct. 17, 2006).
65. Id. § 7.
66. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008).
67. Id. at 2266, citing IN.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001).
68. Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739 (2005), (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd(a) (2006)).
69. Id. at 2274.
70. 128 S.Ct. at 2296.
71. U.N. Human Rights Council, Martin Sheinin, Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights,
Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development: Report of
the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/6/17/Add.3, at 2-3 (Nov. 22, 2007).
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of appearance of impartiality," and also addressed various issues concerning
evidentiary proceedings before these commissions and the consequences of
acquittal or completion of sentence following conviction.72
As mentioned earlier, President Obama did not reject the use of military
commissions to try detainees, although he considered them as constituted under the
Bush administration "flawed" and needing reform. He stated his proposed plan of
reform:
We will no longer permit the use of evidence-as evidence statements
that have been obtained using cruel, inhuman or degrading interrogation
methods. We will not longer place the burden to prove that hearsay is
unreliable on the opponent of the hearsay, and we will give detainees
greater latitude in selecting their own counsel, and more protections if
they refuse to testify [, thus making] our military commissions a more
credible and effective means of administering justice..."'3
The President said that he would work with Congress to reform the military
commissions system. The legislation backed by his administration for revising the
military commissions was included in section 1031 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010. 74  Under the proposed Act, alien
individuals previously labeled "unlawful enemy combatants" are now called
"unprivileged enemy belligerents," who, having engaged in hostilities or supported
hostilities against the United States can be tried before the commissions for
violation of the laws of war and other offenses. The Act would establish
procedures governing the use of these commissions.
2. Appraisal and recommendations
The military commissions system came under criticism both nationally and
internationally. For example, Lord Goldsmith, then Attorney General of the
United Kingdom, said in May 2006 that he was "unable to accept that the US
military tribunals proposed for those detained at Guantanamo Bay offered
sufficient guarantees of a fair trial in accordance with international standards. 7 5
72. Id., ch. Ill.
73. President's National Security Remarks, supra note 5.
74. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, S. 1390, H.R. 2647, 11 1th Cong.
Ch. 47A, Subch. I, § 948(b)-(d) (2009).
75. UK calls for Guantanamo closure, BBC NEWS, May 10, 2006, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/politics/4759317.stm. More recently, Lord Goldsmith has shared
his reflections:
[M]y view of the original Military Commissions for those detained at
Guantanamo Bay are well known. When British nations were slated for trial I
went to Washington to negotiate. My position was simple: put them on trial, a
fair trial in accordance with international standards or release them. I considered
the rules and regulations in detail over a period of months in the summer and fall
of 2003. My clear conclusion was that the Military Commissions did not provide
such guarantees. I advised that we should not allow our citizens to stand trial in
such circumstances and insisted that they be returned to the UK -- which
ultimately they were.
Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 30.
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That was before the Congress adopted the Military Commissions Act of 2006.
However, even after the new legislation was adopted, the system was not
acceptable to many critics, especially since it did not prohibit the use of evidence
obtained through coercion, it treated aliens and US citizens differently, and it
excluded the application of habeas corpus.
76
Now that President Obama has prohibited the use of evidence obtained
through "cruel, inhuman, or degrading" interrogation methods, a major stumbling
block is lifted. Also, he has indicated that US proceedings will comply with
generally accepted international standards of due process. The reformed military
commissions must be seen as impartial, capable of providing fair trials, and they
should offer essential procedural guarantees, such as those embodied in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.77  These include the
presumption of innocence,78 the right to have the judgment pronounced publicly,
79
the right to be informed promptly of the charges,80 the right to have counsel of
one's choosing,81 the right to be tried without delay,8 2 the right to be tried in one's
presence,8 3 the right to call witnesses and to cross-examine the prosecution's






The policy of rendition means "the return of a fugitive from one state to the
state where the fugitive is accused or convicted of a crime. 87 Such a transfer is
outside the official process of extradition to return the fugitive to the receiving
country to face legal process. Renditions undertaken by the Bush administration
are termed "extraordinary" because after September 11, 2001, the CIA was
authorized to engage in transporting outside any judicial process suspected
terrorists to undisclosed locations around the world where they were kept
76. Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 30. Lord Goldsmith considered these provisions to be the major
problems, along with the provision which "allows evidence that would not be admitted normally to be
relied on." Id.
77. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entered into force March 23, 1976, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
78. Id. art. 14(2).
79. Id. art. 14(1).
80. Id. art. 14(3)(a).
81. Id. art. 14(3)(b).
82. Id. art. 14(3)(c).
83. Id. art. 14(3)(d).
84. Id. art. 14(3)(e).
85. Id. art. 14(3)(g).
86. See generally Leila Nadya Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmares
from the War on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200 (2007); Louis Fisher, Extraordinary Rendition:
The Price of Secrecy, 57 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 1405 (2008); Robert Johnson, Note: Extraordinary
Rendition: A Wrong Without a Right, 43 UNIV. RICH. L. REV. 1135 (2009); Mario Silva, Extraordinary
Rendition: A Challenge to Canadian and United States Legal Obligations Under the Convention
Against Torture, 39 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 313 (2009).
87. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1322 (8th ed. 2004).
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incommunicado and hidden from the Red Cross. The objective was to seek
intelligence through harsh and abusive interrogation.
Those transferred included detainees at Abu Ghraib where they were initially
abused. Subsequently, the CIA employed private contractors to transfer suspected
terrorists in private jets to selected destinations where they faced real risk of torture
or other ill treatment. Investigations have revealed that those rendered were
subjected to brutal, harsh techniques and many were treated in violation of the
Convention Against Torture.88 Several countries were reportedly involved in
allegedly facilitating extraordinary renditions or assisting in the rendition process.
These included Afghanistan, Bosnia, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, Italy,
Japan, Jordan, Macedonia, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden,
Syria, and the United Kingdom.89
The veil of secrecy was eventually lifted after investigative reporting by
journalists, 90 reports by human rights organizations, 9 1 studies conducted by the
88. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, G.A. Res. 39/46 (Annex), U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess.,
Supp. No.51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1985), reprinted in 23 I.L.M 1027 (1984).
89. See STEPHEN GREY, GHOST PLANE: THE TRUE STORY OF THE CIA TORTURE PROGRAM, at
app. B (2006) [hereafter Ghost Plane]; Eminent Jurists Panel, supra note 6, at 81.
90. See, e.g., Ghost Plane, supra note 89; Comm. on Int'l Human Rights of the Ass'n of the Bar of
the City of N.Y. & Ctr. for Human Rights and Global Justice, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Torture by
Proxy: International and Domestic Law Applicable to "Extraordinary Renditions " 15 (2004) available
at http://www.chrgj.org/docs/TortureByProxy.pdf; Dana Priest, Memo Lets CIA Take Detainees Out of
Iraq, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2004, at Al; Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of
America's "Extraordinary Rendition" Program, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005 available at
www.newyorker.com; Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, Rule Change Lets C.I.A. Freely Send Suspects
Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, March 6, 2005, at Al; Dana Priest, CIA's Assurances on Transferred Suspects
Doubted, WASH. POST, March 17, 2005, at Al; Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret
Prisons: Debate is Growing Within Agency About Legality and Moralit, of Overseas System Set Up
After 9/11, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at Al; Dana Priest, CIA Program Withstands New Furor,
WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2005, at Al; Dan Bilefsky, European Inquiry Says C.I.A. Flew 1,000 Flights in
Secret, N.Y. TIMES, April 27, 2006, at AI2; Craig Whitlock, European Probe Finds Signs of CIA-Run
Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, June 8, 2006, at A16; Craig Whitlock, European Report Details Flights by
CIA Aircraft, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2006, at A14; Stephen Grey & Doreen Carvajal, Secret Prisons in
2 Countries Held Qaeda Suspects, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2007, at A12; Molly Moore,
Report Gives Details on CIA Prisons, WASH. POST, June 9, 2007, at Al.
91. See, e.g., Amnesty International, USA, Below the Radar: Front Companies Used in Secret
Flights to Torture and "Disappearance, " At Index No. AMR 51/054/2006, April 4, 2006; Human
Rights Watch, Sweden Violated Torture Ban in CIA Rendition: Diplomatic Assurances Against Torture
Offer No Protection From Abuse (Nov. 9, 2006) available at www.hrw.org. A 2008 report by Amnesty
International details several European states' role in rendition and secret detention, Amnesty
International, State of Denial: Europe's Role in Rendition and Secret Detention, Al Index No. Eur.
01/003/2008 (2008). The organization reports
European states concealed their role in renditions and secret detention until
2004. Today, after painstaking research by Amnesty International, other NGOs,
journalists, lawyers, prosecutors in a few European states, and two bodies of the
Council of Europe and the European Parliament, some of the facts are now
known -- as is the suffering of the victims of rendition and enforced
disappearance and their families. But much remains concealed, due largely to
the failure of states to co-operate with investigations or to carry their own
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Council of Europe92 and the United Kingdom,93 and hearings before the US
Congress.94 Congress subsequently enacted the Detainee Treatment Act95 to ban
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.
In a news conference on June 9, 2006, President Bush eventually confirmed
the existence of the CIA's rendition program.96 Subsequently, on September 6,
2006, he revealed further information on the CIA rendition program.97 He said
that, in addition to the suspected terrorists held at Guantdnamo,
a small number of suspected terrorist leaders and operatives captured
during the war have been held and questioned outside the United States,
in a separate program operated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This
group includes individuals believed to be the key architects of the
September the 1 th attacks and attacks on the USS Cole, an operative
involved in the bombings of our Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and
individuals involved in other attacks that have taken the lives of
innocent civilians across the world. These are dangerous men with
unparalleled knowledge about terrorist networks and their plans of new
attacks. The security of our Nation and the lives of our citizens depend
on our ability to learn what these terrorists know.
98
independent and impartial investigations.
Id. at 2.
92. See, e.g., Report, Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Legal Affairs
and Human Rights, Rapporteur Dick Marty, Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-State
Transfers Involving Council of Europe Member States, Doc. 10957, June 12, 2006 available at
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc06/EDOC 10957.htm (revealing a
global "spider's web" of CIA detentions and transfers and alleged collusion by 14 Council of Europe
Member States); Report, Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights, Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of Detainees Involving Council of Europe
Member States: Second Report, Explanatory Memorandum, Rapporteur Dick Marty, Doc. 11302 rev.,
June 11, 2007 (reporting that secret agreements developed around NATO authorization agreed on
October 4, 2001, led to grant of blanket overflight rights and access to ports and military bases by
European countries for covert CIA operations, including secret detentions and rendition); Comm. on the
Alleged use of Eur. Countries by the CIA for the Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, Eur.
Par]. Doc. A6-0020/2007 (2007) available at www.europarl.europa.eu.
93. See, e.g., All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition, Briefing: Torture by
Proxy: International and Domestic Law Applicable to "Extraordinary Renditions" (Dec. 2005),
available at http://www.chrgj.org/docs/APPG-NYU%20Briefing%2OPaper.pdf.
94. See, e.g., Rendition to Torture: The Case of Maher: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs and the
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. (2007).
95. DTA, supra note 68.
96. President's news conference with Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen of Denmark, 42
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1105, 1111 (June 9, 2006).
97. President George W. Bush, Remarks on the War on Terror, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1569, 1570 (Sept. 6, 2006). President Bush said, "[W]hat I'll tell the Prime Minister, is that in cases
where we're not able to extradite somebody who is dangerous, sometimes renditions take place. It's
been a part of our Government for quite a period of time ... in order to protect people. And as we do
so, we protect the sovereign rights of nations that we're involved with." Id.
98. Id.
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President Bush also disclosed that fourteen suspected terrorists, who were
then held in CIA custody, were to be transferred to Guantdnamo and their
questioning there would comply with the new Army Field Manual.99
As mentioned above, early in his administration President Obama ordered the
closure of CIA secret prisons and prohibited the Agency from operating any such
detention facility in the future. l00  However, he did not ban the transfer of
suspected terrorists to other countries, but instead appointed a Task Force to
review transfer policies of individuals to other countries. On August 24, 2009,
Attorney General Eric Holder announced the Task Force's proposal of new
policies under which the practice of transferring terrorism suspects to third
countries for detention and interrogation will continue but will "ensure that U.S.
practices in such transfers comply with U.S. law, policy and international
obligations and do not result in the transfer of individuals to face torture."' 0 '
2. Appraisal and Recommendations
Extraordinary renditions conducted by the CIA came under heavy criticism,
both domestically and internationally. The US policy and its practices were seen
as violations of the basic human rights norms, as prisoners were reportedly tortured
and ill-treated. The case of Maher Arar'0 2 brought home the abuses associated
with such renditions. Arar, who holds dual citizenship of Canada and Syria and
lives and works in Canada, was detained at Kennedy Airport in New York while in
transit to Canada in September 2002 under suspicion of association with al Qaeda.
He was arrested and held for thirteen days by the US authorities and interrogated
without access to counsel, and was then transferred to Syria, notwithstanding his
objection that he risked torture there. Held in Syria for nearly a year, he was
repeatedly tortured there. Eventually Syria concluded that Arar had no terrorist
links and released him.
The Canadian government came under heavy criticism as it was considered
complicit in this rendition. A commission of inquiry established by the Canadian
government found Arar to have no association with al Qaeda and also confirmed
that he had been tortured. 10 3 He received financial compensation from Canada, 10 4
since Canada had likely supplied the US with information that was "inaccurate."
The Commission concluded that both the Canadian and US officials violated their
99. Id. at 1573-74.
100. Exec. Order No. 13,491, supra note 53.
101. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Special Task Force on Interrogations and Transfer
Policies Issues Its Recommendations to the President (Aug. 24, 2009) available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/August/09.ag0835.html.
102. Comm'n of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report
of the Events Relating to Maher Arar, Vol. I Factual Background, Vol. I1 Analysis &
Recommendations, Canada, Sept. 18, 2006 [Arar Commission].
103. Id.
104. lan Austen, Canada Will Pay $9.75 Million to Man Sent to Syria and Tortured, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 27, 2007, at A5.
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obligations under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and violated the
principle of non refoulement by carrying out the extraordinary rendition.
10 5
Arar brought suit in a US federal district court seeking money damages and
declaratory relief from the government and several officials, including Attorney
General John Ashcroft, 10 6 but he was denied a remedy. The Bush administration
claimed that the lawsuit implicated national security and foreign policy
considerations. The district court's response was that
the task of balancing individual rights against national-security concerns
is one that courts should not undertake without the guidance or the
authority of the coordinate branches, in whom the Constitution imposes
responsibility for our foreign affairs and national security. Those
branches have the responsibility to determine whether judicial oversight
is appropriate. Without explicit legislation, judges should be hesitant to
fill an arena that, until now, has been left untouched-perhaps
deliberately-by the Legislative and Executive branches. To do
otherwise would threaten "our customary policy of deference to the
President in matters of foreign affairs."... [citations omitted.] In sum,
whether the policy be seeking to undermine or overthrow foreign
governments, or rendition, judges should not, in the absence of explicit
direction by Congress, hold officials who carry out such policies liable
for damages even if such conduct violates our treaty obligations or
customary international law.
07
On Arar's appeal, the Second Circuit characterized the case as an immigration
case, thus denying Arar any remedy'0 8 on his claim invoking alleged violations
under the Torture Victim Prevention Act and the Fifth Amendment of the US
Constitution."
It is worth noting that the Convention Against Torture's ban on torture is
absolute. In Saadi v. Italy,11 ° the European Court of Human Rights unequivocally
stated that a state's obligation not to expel or extradite an individual to the
receiving state where s/he would face a real risk of torture was subject to no
exceptions whatsoever, no matter how "undesirable or dangerous" the involved
person's conduct may be.1 1' This is the existing standard and it is the one the US
must follow.
105. Arar Commission, supra note 102, Vol. II, at 13-16.
106. Arar v. Ashcrofi, 414 F.Supp.2d 250 (E.D. N.Y. 2006).
107. Arar, 414 F.Supp.2d at 283.
108. Arar v. Ashcroft, 537 F.3d 157, 184 (2d. Cir. 2008) (denying private right of action for a
victim claiming alleged rendition to a receiving state where there was a likelihood that torture would
occur).
109. Arar, 537 F.3d at 163.
110. Saadi v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 37201/06 (2008). See also U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
Views of 6 November 2006, Alzery v. Sweden, Communication No. 1416/2005; U.N. Comm. against
Torture, Views of 20 May 2005, Agiza v. Sweden, Communication No. 233/2003, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (2005).
111. Saadi, supra note 110.
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The Eminent Jurists Panel has aptly described extraordinary rendition as
violating "numerous human rights, including the rights protecting individuals
against arbitrary arrest, enforced disappearance, forcible transfer, or subjection to
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment."' 
1 2 The Panel further
noted:
When a rendered person is held in secret detention, or held for
interrogation by authorities of other States, with no information
supplied to family members or others regarding the detention, this
constitutes an enforced disappearance, a crime under international law.
Where renditions are part of a widespread and systematic government
policy, they may also amount to crimes against humanity. A raft of
international human rights and international criminal law standards
apply to such situations. 
13
If the United States continues to use the practice of rendition, it must ensure
that it scrupulously abides by its obligations under international law. If there are
substantial grounds to believe, based on past practices, that the receiving country is
likely to subject the transferred individual to torture or cruel and inhuman
treatment, no transfer should take place. Diplomatic assurances from the receiving




The United States, along with Israel, has faced world-wide criticism for the
policy of targeted killing. 1 5 Those who distinguish targeted killing from extra-
judicial executions rely upon the invocation of international humanitarian law
instead of human rights law. They also would distinguish targeted killing from
assassination, which they would argue involves treachery or perfidy and is the
killing of a political leader." 6 The US has continued its use of unmanned Predator
drones in the aftermath of 9/11 for launching missiles and targeting suspected
terrorists. The case of the US targeting an associate of Osama Bin Laden in
Yemen, along with several other suspected terrorists, in November 2002, received
wide attention, especially as there was no armed conflict in the area where the
attack took place."17
As the US pursues its global "war on terror," accounts of such attacks are
reported every day. While the critics consider these attacks a violation of
112. Eminent Jurists Panel, supra note 6, at 80.
113. Id. at 81 (citation omitted).
114. See, e.g., JULIA HALL, NOT THE WAY FORWARD: THE UK'S DANGEROUS RELIANCE ON
DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES (Human Rights Watch Oct. 22, 2008) available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/75603/section/9 (asserting that diplomatic assurances cannot be trusted).
115. See generally W. Jason Fisher, Targeted Killing, Norms, and International Law, 45 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 711 (2007); Amos Guiora, Targeted Killing as Active Self-Defense, 37 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 319 (2005).
116. See Guiora, supra note 115, at 330.
117. See David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or
Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 171, 171-173 (2005).
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international law,I18 others consider them legal and effective, 119 as they satisfy the
international humanitarian law requirement of "proportionality." It is also argued
that the norm permitting targeted killing as a counter-terrorism tactic is emerging
and evolving, 120 and that international lawyers should respond to the likely
emergence of this norm by defining "the limits of targeted killing's legitimate use
and distinguish[ing] it from assassination and extra-judicial execution so as to
protect the strength of those legal rules and norms."'1
2'
One could justify the targeted strikes by the US in Pakistan on the ground that
the geographical region of conflict stretches from Afghanistan to Pakistan, that
suspected al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists and their associates often cross that
porous frontier, and that Pakistan has implicitly consented to such attacks.
While the Obama administration has prohibited the Central Intelligence
Agency's plans to assassinate al Qaeda leaders, the practice of targeted killings is
likely to continue. 1
22
2. Appraisal and Recommendation
Critics are likely to consider the attempt to distinguish targeted killings from
either extra-judicial killings or assassinations as nothing more than playing with
semantics. The key debatable issue remains the United States' claim of conducting
a global war on terror and hence its justification for targeted killing of suspected
terrorists anywhere in the world instead of its being limited to the area of
hostilities. It is recommended that the Obama administration review its policy
authorizing the killing of suspected terrorists outside the geographical region of
armed conflict. However, as the Obama administration continues to follow the
global "war on terror" paradigm, it is likely to consider suspected terrorists all over
the world as valid targets. It is recommended that the administratioli review this
policy with respect to its geographical aspects; and if killings are sought outside
the area of hostilities the "proportionality" element be strictly adhered to, and that
if terrorists can be apprehended killings should be a last resort.
III. OTHER PERSPECTIVES
The contributions in this Symposium issue of the Denver Journal of
International Law & Policy analyze the Bush administration's claim that it was at
war against the terrorists, that the war was global, and that, pursuant to the nature
of the conflict, the administration followed reasonable policies and practices to
118. See, e.g., Orna Ben-Naftali & Keren R. Michaeli, We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law:
A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings, 36 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 233 (2003);
Kretzmer, supra note 117; Vincent-Joel Proulx, If the Hat Fits, Wear It, If the Turban Fits, Run For
Your Life: Reflections on the Indefinite Detention and Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists, 56
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protect the US and its interests. As this symposium took place in October 2008,
even in their revised submissions the participants had little opportunity to address
the incoming administration's approach.
Based on the Henry and Mary Bryan Distinguished Lecture delivered by
Professor Leila Sadat, the lead essay is A Presumption of Guilt: The Unlawful
Enemy Combatant and the U.S. War on Terror. Sadat is highly critical of the Bush
administration's labeling of suspected terrorists as "unlawful enemy combatants,"
which she calls a "euphemistic and novel term." This classification, she argues,
has led to the deprivation of "normal" legal protections, such as the presumption of
innocence, to those so classified. She asserts that the US violated both
international human rights law and international humanitarian law in continuing
this practice, and concludes with recommendations for the new administration,
several of which the Obama administration has already followed. These include
the closing of the Guantdnamo facility, the establishment of a task force to evaluate
detention policies, mandating humane treatment for all detainees in US custody,
recommitment to the adherence to the domestic and international rule of law, and
to give serious consideration to ratifying the American Convention on Human
Rights.
In Immigration and Immigration Law After 9/11: Getting it Straight,
Professor James A.R. Nafziger rigorously analyzes the US immigration policy in
the wake of the 9/11 tragedy. He studies in detail the contemporary trends in the
US among migrants, law enforcement, and public opinion, which he rightly
considers are essential to understand before one explores options to shape the
future US immigration law and policy. Nafziger suggests that since 9/11, the
public agenda in the United States has been primarily concerned with issues related
to border security, guest workers, more rigorous sanctions for employing
undocumented persons, and expanding the opportunities for legal residency and
citizenship. However, he notes that unfortunately Congress has not been able to
pass a single comprehensive bill addressing all these concerns. He finds that after
9/11 terrorist threats and the presence of undocumented workers in the US were
seen as closely associated and he recommends that the issues of migration be de-
coupled from terrorist threats to homeland security.
Professor David Aronofsky and Matthew Cooper, Esq., ask in their essay, The
War on Terror and International Human Rights: Does Europe Get it Right? After
an in-depth study of what they consider to be intractable problems in US litigation
regarding the war on terror, they answer that Europe does indeed get it right as it
wages its "war on terror" without violating fundamental legal rights. And, if
violations occur, European courts provide meaningful redress to the victims of ill
treatment by their governments.
The authors study several selected cases in US courts in which suspected
terrorists detained were denied fundamental due process rights at trial. They
meticulously analyze the case law addressing extraordinary renditions, "enemy
combatant" status, warrantless wiretapping and searches, US collaboration with
human rights violators in other countries, habeas corpus violations, and military
tribunals. They highlight what they consider to be some of the fundamental legal
policy problems with the results of US litigation on these issues as they find them
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to be inconsistent with both human rights principles and sound national security
law principles.
The authors next study pertinent cases before European courts, which are
similar to those addressed by US courts. The difference is that European courts,
contrasted with their US counterparts, have scrupulously adhered to guaranteeing
human rights to the accused. These rights include full investigations, fair trials, no
refoulement of suspected terrorists to a receiving state where there is a substantial
likelihood of torture and other ill treatment, effective investigations of allegations
of government abuses, adjudication of allegations of mistreatment, inadmissibility
of evidence obtained by coercive interrogations, prohibition of judicially
unsupervised electronic surveillance, and finally, adequate legal remedies to
victims of abuses. They recommend that the US examine and learn from the
European practice.
Professor David Akerson and Natalie Knowlton, Esq., raise a difficult issue in
their article President Obama and the International Criminal Law of Successor
Liability. The question relates to the doctrine of command responsibility, which is
codified in international humanitarian law and applied as a form of individual
criminal liability by all the international tribunals created since the establishment
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia. Under the
command responsibility theory, a commander could face criminal liability for
failing to punish his subordinates who committed the crimes. But what if the
commander in question has assumed command after the commission of the crime?
That is precisely the issue regarding successor liability-does one who has had no
involvement in the crimes, or opposed the policies of her/his predecessor have a
duty to punish and face criminal liability for failure to discharge that duty?
The authors analyze the recent developments regarding the current status of
successor liability under international law and then review the allegations of
torture and unlawful detainment committed by the Bush administration. Under the
US Constitution the President as Commander-in-Chief has the superior-
subordinate relationship as he has effective control over subordinates. The
question is: is President Obama, as Commander-in-Chief, who also has the
knowledge that under the Bush administration these alleged criminal acts occurred,
criminally liable if he does not punish these subordinates? The authors provide
policy arguments both in favor of and against successor liability. They conclude
that, while the law is unclear, the call on President Obama to appoint a special
prosecutor to investigate crimes allegedly committed during his predecessor's term
raises the relevance of this topic.
Professor Upendra D. Acharya addresses the perennial intractable problem of
defining terrorism in War On Terror or Terror Wars: The Problem in Defining
Terrorism. He traces the history of myriad attempts by the international
community to find a definition on which there can be consensus and how the
failure to do so resulted in a patchwork of substitutes rather than a comprehensive
approach. The outcome was the negotiation of thirteen international treaties
relating to terrorism in specific contexts-civil aviation, internationally protected
persons, maritime issues, nuclear material, plastic explosives, taking of hostages,
suppression of the financing of terrorism and of terrorist bombings, safety of the
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continental shelf, and violence at airports. These treaties established international
standards designating specific criminal acts as terrorism.
Acharya studies in depth these treaties related to terrorism and then reviews
the UN General Assembly and Security Council pronouncements of terrorism as a
crime in the various resolutions these bodies have adopted. This is followed by a
detailed look at how in the post-9/11 era terrorism was transformed into an act of
war from an act of crime and what the implications of this change are. He is
critical of the war on terror paradigm and concludes that the failure internationally
to define terrorism has led to international "lawlessness" and "unilateral
vigilantism." He makes a plea to the international community to agree on a
broader definition of terrorism which includes the terrorist activities conducted by
all states-failed, non failed, and powerful states, as well.
In the final paper, Krishma C. Parsad, Esq., examines the interpretation and
application of international law by the United States in its practice of extraordinary
renditions in Illegal Renditions and Improper Treatment. An Obligation to Provide
Refugee Remedies Pursuant to the Convention Against Torture. Her focus is on
the principle of non-refoulement embodied in the 1951 Refugee Convention and
subsequently it is made non-derogable in the Convention Against Torture.
After assessing the pertinent law applicable to renditions-the Convention
Against Torture, cases by the Committee Against Torture and other international
tribunals, and domestic US legislation, especially US refugee law-Parsad stresses
the importance of judicial review for asylum-seekers and strict scrutiny
surrounding diplomatic assurances. She calls for the application of human rights
treaties by states when they act outside of their respective territories, and
specifically for extraterritorial application of refugee law and policy, which
provides remedies for people in of being sent to countries that engage in torture
and other unlawful treatment.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is broad consensus that the Bush administration's war on terror led to
violations of international human rights law as well as international humanitarian
law. There is equally wide consensus that the Obama administration is
endeavoring to change the prior policies so as to conform its practices to what the
international community would perceive as adherence to the rule of law, both
domestically and internationally.
Notwithstanding this shift under the Obama administration, the global "war
on terror" nomenclature has serious implications. How far can the US reach in its
use of force against suspected terrorists? How long can it detain them? Can or
should it render individuals to other countries for interrogation and intelligence-
gathering? Can or should it try suspected terrorists in special security courts or
military tribunals? How to balance the law enforcement model and the laws of war
in order to accomplish the goal of ensuring national security remains as yet
unresolved. Similarly, how to ensure both national security and personal liberty
(which includes fundamental human rights and basic due process guarantees) has
yet to be decided. Given that international terrorism is likely to endure at least for
some time in the future, the Obama administration and its successors, as well as
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other liberal democratic states, will have to struggle with these questions. The
work in progress must not lose sight of the need to strengthen international human
rights law and not even inadvertently dilute it.

